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Abstract The works of the Tibetan logician Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169)
make abundant use of a particular type of argument that I term ‘argument by parallels’.
Their main characteristic is that the instigator of the argument, addressing a thesis in a
domain A, introduces a parallel thesis in an unrelated domain B. And in the ensuing
dialogue, each of the instigator’s statements consists in replicating his interlocutor’s
previous assertion, mutatis mutandis, in the other domain (A or B). I show that such a
dialogue involves two parallel arguments that develop in an intersecting zigzag pat-
tern, and discuss the principles involved in the establishment of the conclusion from
the perspective of parity of reasoning and analogical argument. I examine the overall
rhetorical strategy directing the use of arguments by parallels and the pedagogical and
explanatory functions they can serve. I also evaluate the plausibility of their use in
Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge’s works mirroring a contemporary practice of oral debate,
and reflect on the status of such arguments in the framework of Indo-Tibetan logic.
Keywords Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge  Tibetan  Logic  Argument by parallels 
Rhetorical strategy  Debate
1 Introduction
The Tibetan thinker Phya (/Phywa) pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109?–1169) (hereafter:
Phya pa [tcha-ba])1, played a key role in the development of the Tibetan tradition of
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logic and epistemology, a tradition that has been kept alive up to the present day.
While based on the foundational works of the Indian thinkers Digna¯ga (6th c.) and
Dharmakı¯rti (7th c.), the Tibetan tradition displays an individual character by its use
of indigenous methods of expositions, the development of its own technical
terminology and of logical inquiries into new topics, as well as through its novel
understanding of the thought of the Indian founding fathers. Phya pa is especially
famous for original interpretations that were instrumental to the subsequent
development of Tibetan epistemology. In addition, the tradition also ascribes to him
certain innovations in the field of debate, namely a method of argumentation by
chains of consequences (thal phreng).2 This method, although widely attested in
Tibetan works from the fifteenth century3, turns out to be conspicuously absent in
the Dispeller of the Darkness of Mind and the Sunray of Wisdom, two works of Phya
pa on epistemology that have been re-discovered only recently.4 Nevertheless, Phya
pa’s treatises do attest to a number of original features, both with regard to the
positions held by the author (many of which stand out as rather unorthodox
interpretations of Dharmakı¯rti’s thought) and to his argumentative style. Concerning
the latter, Phya pa’s epistemological works profusely employ a particular type of
argument that takes the form of a dialogue, the main characteristic of which is that
the answers of one of the debaters all consist in parallel statements that replicate his
interlocutor’s previous assertion, mutatis mutandis, in another (usually completely
unrelated) domain.5 This quite unique and somewhat bewildering style of
argumentation, which I have termed argumentation ‘‘by parallels’’, is, to my
knowledge, absent from Indian epistemological literature, and does not appear to
2 This claim seems to have originated with Stcherbatsky, who however appears to be merely repeating a
traditional attribution. ‘‘The first author to compose an independent work on logic is Chaba-choikyi-senge
(1109–1169). He is the creator of a special Tibetan logical style…’’ (Stcherbatsky, 1994, p. 55) and ‘‘A special
literary style has been created for the brief formulation of such a chain of reasoning, it is called the method of
‘sequence and reason’ and its establishment is ascribed to the lama Chaba-choikyi-senge’’ (ibid. 58).
3 Argumentation by chains of consequences, each of which takes the form ‘‘this follows (thal), because
of that (phyir)’’, is one of the formal characteristics of the so-called ‘‘bsdus grwa’’ literature and of
Tibetan handbooks for debate (yig cha). An early occurrence of argumentation by chains of consequences
is attested in a fourteenth century work by Bu ston (1290–1364), whereas the earliest available bsdus
grwa work, the Rwa stod bsdus grwa by ’Jam dbyangs mChog lha ’od zer (1429–1500), dates to the
middle of the fifteenth century. It is notable that the structure and contents of this work and other bsdus
grwa manuals differ significantly from the works of Phya pa, thus annulling another widely held
ascription to Phya pa, namely the paternity of bsdus grwa literature.
4 The works of Phya pa were, until recently, considered lost, and the ideas of this philosopher were
known to us only through the accounts and/or criticism of later authors. Sixteen of his works have been
recovered at the monastery of ’Bras spungs and are now available as part of a collection of works by early
bKa’ gdams pa authors published in facsimile in Chengdu in bKa’ gdams gsung ’bum phyogs sgrig thengs
dang po’. Volume 8 of this collection contains three works of Phya pa on epistemology: a summarized
exposition of Dharmakı¯rti’s thought entitled ‘‘Epistemology, the Dispeller of the Darkness of Mind’’
(Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel) (hereafter: Dispeller), a commentary on Dharmakı¯rti’s Prama¯n: avinis´caya, the
‘‘Sunray of wisdom that penetrates the difficult points of reasoning and formulation, an extensive
commentary of the Prama¯n: avinis´caya’’ (Tshad ma rnam par nges pa’i ’grel bshad yi ge dang rigs pa’i
gnad la ’jug pa’i shes rab kyi ’od zer) (hereafter: Sunray of Wisdom), and a topical outline of the same
work (Tshad ma rnam par nges pa’i bsdus don). This paper is based on textual material from the first two
(Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge 2006a, b).
5 Phya pa’s Dispeller includes no less than 65 occurrences of such arguments in its 96 folios (the
equivalent of about 200 typed pages in transcription).
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have enjoyed much popularity in later Tibetan literature. In this paper, I will first
describe the generic features of these arguments on the basis of the instances that
can be found in the Dispeller and the Sunray of Wisdom, and present one case as an
illustration. I will then attempt to characterize and evaluate these arguments in view
of the function that Phya pa ascribes to them, and shall also reflect on their use
against the background of the theoretical rules for correct proofs and refutations
prescribed in Indo-Tibetan literature and by the author himself.
2 The Structure of Arguments by Parallels
2.1 Generic Features
Arguments by parallels can be characterized by their structure as well as by their
specific syntax and associated terminology. They take the form of a dialogue
between the debater initiating the argument, who I will call the ‘‘instigator’’ (I), and
the debater who I will call the ‘‘respondent’’ (R).6 One can distinguish three stages
in their discussion: (i) an initial stage (Sect. 2.1.1), (ii) an intermediate development
(Sect. 2.1.2), (iii) a final stage (Sect. 2.1.3).
2.1.1 The Initial Stage
The initial stage of the argument starts with the statement of a thesis P under
discussion. The thesis P, which stands as the instigator’s target, represents either an
objection to the instigator’s own position by a real or hypothetical opponent, or a
philosophical tenet held by another philosopher. Accordingly, the thesis P is stated
either in a conditional form—‘‘if one were to state…’’ (…smra na;…zhe na;…brjod
na), ‘‘if one were to admit…’’ (…’dod na), or ‘‘if one were to object…’’ (…rgol na)—
or as an independent sentence reporting somebody’s position (…zhes zer ba) followed
by an expression like ‘‘in such a case’’ (de Ita na, de ltar na, de ’dod na).
The first characteristic of arguments by parallels is that the instigator does not
address the thesis P directly, but rather retorts to it with a parallel thesis P0. P0 is
frequently introduced by the verb mgo sgre, or simply sgre (that I translate in this
context as ‘‘to retort’’), which conveys the idea of ‘‘repetition’’ or ‘‘analogy’’.7 The
6 These terms are introduced here to distinguish the respective roles of the debaters, but they do not
correspond to Tibetan terms. I intentionally avoid the existing appellations ‘‘proponent/opponent’’
([snga] rgol ba/phyi rgol), questioner/answerer (rtsod pa po/dam bca’ ba) etc., as they would be
confusing in this context.
7 This verb occurs under various orthographies: mgo sgre, mgo bsgre, ’go (b)sgre. The Bod-rgya
dictionary explains mgo bsgre as rigs mtshungs sbyar ba’am rigs mtshungs par byas pa (‘‘analogical
application or analogy’’) (Zhang Yisun 1985). Goldstein et al. (2001) gives for mgo sgre the synonym rig
’gre and its homophones rigs ’gre and rigs (b)sgre, translating them with ‘‘logical reasoning/inference’’,
whereas he gives as the first meaning of the verb ’gre: ‘‘to reason by analogy’’ (the second meaning being
‘‘to roll over’’). Ja¨schke gives for sgre and ’gre ‘‘to roll (over)’’ as the first meaning, and ‘‘to repeat’’ as
the second (Ja¨schke 1995). Das for his part distinguishes the meanings of the homophones ’gre ‘‘to roll
(over)’’, and sgre ‘‘to repeat’’ (Sarat Chandra Das 1992).
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expression mgo sgre is also used by Phya pa as a name for the argument by parallels
as a whole.8 The Tibetan term sgre corresponds to the Sanskrit ‘‘atides´a’’, a term
used notably in logic, medicine and grammar to denote the transfer of a property,
rule, or prescription, etc., to something else.9 However, in only a limited number of
the arguments by parallels found in Phya pa’s works does the parallel statement P0
keep a common attribute with P. These cases, in which the instigator retorts for
instance to a thesis P of the form ‘‘A is X’’ with a statement P0 of the form ‘‘B also is
X’’, bear the specific heading of mtshungs pa (literally: ‘‘similarity’’).10 In the
majority of arguments by parallels, no property from P is retained in P0. The
relevance of P0 is only a matter of the preservation of the formal structure of P, that
is to say, of the relations between the constitutive elements of P. There is thus no
domain constraint as to the choice of the retort-thesis P0. In Phya pa’s texts, cows or
plants are frequently selected for this role—making these arguments quite startling
at first. Consider for instance the reply offered to an opponent contesting the validity
of inference, saying:
Inference cannot be the comprehension of something true (i.e. it cannot be a
valid cognition) because it is a wrong cognition insofar as, depending on a
concept, it is erroneous with regard to what is apprehended.
Phya pa initiates an argument by parallels with the following retort:
A sprout could not be the cause of a visual cognition, because it emerges
subsequently with regard to the seed.11
Although logic and botany are two quite distinct domains, both the initial statement
and the retort instantiate the structure ‘‘A is not B because it is X with regard to Y’’.
In order for the argument to be continued past the initial stage, it is additionally
necessary that the instigator’s P0 is a statement that motivates a response from his
8 See for instance Phya pa Choa kyi seng ge (2006a, 29b4) where such an argument occurs in a section
entitled mgo bsgres dgag pa ‘‘refutation by (a) mgo bsgre’’.
9 Cf. Oberhammer et al. (1991, p. 22): ‘‘Der Terminus bezeichnet das Darlegen von etwas, indem man
auf etwas an anderer Stelle Vorgetragenes hinweist und dieses in die gegensta¨ndliche Darlegung
einbezieht, ohne es nochmals vorzutragen’’. In the Abhidharmakos´abha¯s:ya ad I.39 for instance, the
Sanskrit original ‘‘atides´a’’ is translated as ‘‘bsgre ba’’ (For the Tibetan, see sDe dge 4090, 46b7). In this
passage, the ‘‘transfer’’ (atides´a) consists in the attribution of the conclusion reached for visible form to
the cases of sound, odour, taste and touch, namely that they are ‘‘common’’ (sabha¯ga). The opponent
argues that being ‘‘common’’ can be said of sound, which, like visible form, is perceived at a distance and
can be perceived by many people, but not of odour, taste and touch that are not perceived at a distance,
but only when they enter a close relation with the respective sense-faculty. Hence the transfer of the
property ‘‘common’’ must be done with regard to the organ, not the object (Vasubandhu (1967, p. 28, 15)
:bhavatu s´abda evam. gandha¯dayas tu ya ekena gr: hyante na te ’nyena pra¯ptagrahan: a¯d ity
asa¯dha¯ran: atva¯d es: a¯m: caks:ura¯divad atides´o nya¯yyah: ).
10 For instance, in the context of the refutation of idealism, someone objects to the proposition that ‘‘pleasure
and pain are easily distinguished through experience’’ with the retort that ‘‘white and the visual cognition of
white are easily distinguished through experience’’. Cf. Phya pa Choa kyi seng ge (2006a, 3a5–3a6) under the
heading ‘‘bde sdug dang mtshungs pa’’ (similarity with [the case of] pleasure and pain): bde sdug rdzas tha
dad par cis nges | myong pas nges so zhe na | dkar po dang myig shes tha dad par yang myong pas nges so…
11 Phya pa Choa kyi seng ge (2006a, 33b9–34a1) : rjes dpag don spyi la ltos nas gzung pa la ’khrul pa’i
log shes yin pas de 34a1 la bden pa rtogs pas ma khyab po zhe na | myu gu sa bon la ltos te phyis ’byung
yin pas myig gi rnam shes kyi rgyu ma yin par ’gyur ro.
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interlocutor. This is most likely to be the case if P0 is a thesis to which the
respondent does not subscribe. As a way to prompt a response, the parallel statement
P0 is then often stated within a challenging question, such as ‘‘how would you refute
P0?’’, ‘‘what would you say to someone who holds P0?’’ and so on. Another situation
that is seen to prompt a response is the respondent’s acknowledgement, disregarding
whether or not he himself admits P0, that P0 contradicts other tenets in the
instigator’s system.
2.1.2 The Intermediate Development
The initial stage, in which the instigator presents the incriminated thesis P and the
retort P0, is followed by a number of intermediate steps (in Phya pa’s texts, usually
two to four), each of which consists in a statement Sn of the respondent followed by
a statement S0n of the instigator. Both debaters follow implicit rules that determine
the distinctive structure of arguments by parallels:
• The respondent addresses the previous statement S0n-1 of the instigator directly.
He can do it with a question, an entailment, an absurd consequence, an
exemplification, or suchlike. His choice of answer will decide the course of the
discussion.
• The instigator, who, in the initial stage, retorted to the thesis P with a parallel
statement P0, repeats this technique at each step of the intermediate develop-
ment. Thus, each statement S0n of the instigator is parallel to the previous
statement Sn of the respondent. The parallelism is sometimes underlined by
expressions such as ‘‘just like in the previous case…’’ (snga ma ltar na’ang,
snga ma nyid bzhin, snga ma bzhin, snga ma’ang de dang ’dra’o…), which
occasionally substitute for the full formulation of the parallel statement. The use
of the verb ‘‘to retort’’ (mgo sgre) is however restricted to the initial stage. Just
as in the initial stage, the parallelism between S0n and Sn is a matter of structure,
not of common or similar elements. In the intermediate development, no new
domain is introduced for the parallels; the instigator remains within the two
domains introduced in the initial stage, namely that of the thesis and that of the
retort (D and D0). Hence, when the respondent’s statement Sn concerns the initial
domain D, the instigator states a parallel S0n in domain D0, and when Sn concerns
the parallel domain D0, the parallel S0n brings the discussion back to the initial
domain D. The instigator’s statements thus always induce a change of domain,
whereas the respondent’s statements remain within the domain of the previous
statement of the instigator (alternatively D and D0).
2.1.3 The Final Stage
The argumentation by parallels against a thesis P is not always successful for its
instigator. The respondent can indeed manage to show that P and P0 are in fact not
parallel. The nature of the final stage differs accordingly:
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Successful for the instigator. The final stage is in this case the point where the
instigator draws a parallel statement S0f concerning the initial domain of discussion (D)
to which the respondent cannot object further. When dealing with written arguments, it
appears rather as the point where the respondent is not given an opportunity to object
further. Let us note that the instigator’s final statement does not in itself refute the
incriminated thesis P, but is part of the reasons in support of its refutation.12 An example
of such an outcome will be illustrated in the argument by parallels analyzed below.
Unsuccessful for the instigator. An argument is unsuccessful for its instigator
when, in parallel to an absurd consequence Sf relative to the parallel domain D
0
stated by the respondent, the instigator draws as a parallel a consequence S0f relative
to domain D that consists in a view which the respondent actually subscribes to. In
this case, the respondent ends the argument with the remark: ‘‘since we admit that,
how is it similar?’’ (’dod pa nyid yin pas ga la mtshungs). This statement
retrospectively shows that the putative parallel P0 was in fact not parallel to P.
Hence P remains unchallenged by the initial retort.13
P (D) P’ (D’)
S’f (D)Sf (D’)
R I
UnsuccessfulSuccessful
P (D) P’ (D’)
       S’f (D)
Accepted by R
       Sf (D’)
Not accepted by R
R I
We admit S’f (D), hence 
it is not the same!
12 The same can be said of the respondent’s statement Sf in the final stage: it is part of the reasons that
support the rejection of P0, without constituting a refutation in itself.
13 Such a situation is illustrated for instance in an argument where the domain of ‘‘negation’’ is
introduced in parallel to the domain of ‘‘affirmation’’. Namely, the instigator retorts to the thesis P ‘‘by
negating impermanence with regard to permanence in general, one negates impermanence with regard to
a permanent demon’s pot’’ with the parallel P0 ‘‘by establishing the association of existence with pot in
general, one establishes the association of existence with a permanent demon’s pot’’ (in other words, by
proving that pot in general exists, one proves that a permanent demon’s pot also exists). After a few steps
of intermediate development, the respondent comes up with an absurd consequence relative to domain D0
(the domain of affirmation), namely that establishing that there is smoke in the kitchen entails the
establishment that there is mountain’s smoke in the kitchen (more literally: ‘‘establishing the association
of ‘kitchen’ and the universal ‘smoke’ would entail the establishment of the association of ‘kitchen’ and
‘mountain’s smoke’’’). The instigator then draws the parallel for domain D (the domain of negation),
namely that negating that there is smoke in the river entails negating that there is mountain’s smoke in the
river (more literally: ‘‘negating the association of ‘river’ and the universal ‘smoke’ would entail the
negation of the association of ‘river’ with ‘mountain’s smoke’’’). This is meant to be an absurd
consequence by the instigator, but the respondent actually admits this, and hence can claim that the two
cases are not similar. See Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (2006a, 93b3–93b5).
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Predictably enough, in Phya pa’s texts, arguments by parallels always end up
successfully when the instigator is Phya pa himself and always fail when Phya pa
plays the role of the respondent.
2.2 Intersecting Arguments
The sequence of statements in an argument by parallels takes the form: P, P0, S1,
S01, S2, S02 … Sn, S0n, Sn + 1, S0n + 1 … Sf, S0f. The nature of the successive Sn and
S0n in the intermediate development (as described in Sect. 2.1.2) has a notable
consequence: since each statement S0n of the instigator (I) is parallel to a statement
Sn of the respondent (R), and since this statement Sn constitutes a response to the
previous statement S0n-1 of the instigator, which is itself parallel to the respondent’s
statement Sn-1, S
0
n provides, indirectly, an answer to the statement Sn-1 uttered by
the respondent at the previous level.
Sn-1 S’n-1
S’nSn
R I
As the process repeats, we can actually distinguish two arguments that develop in
intersecting zigzag patterns: a first argument T pertaining to the domain D follows
the sequence: P, S01, S2, S03, S4, S05…, whereas a second argument T0, pertaining to
the domain D0, follows the sequence: P0, S1, S02, S3, S04, S5…. While the respective
steps of T and T0 are parallel, the two debaters play mirroring roles: in T, R is the
proponent and I the opponent, and in T0, I is the proponent and R the opponent (see
the table at the end of Sect. 2.3 for a concrete example). In the case of a successful
argument, the final statement S0f of the initiator is parallel to the previous statement
Sf of the respondent and follows it directly in the sequence of the argument by
parallels. But S0f is also the last step of T, and in this regard follows Sf-1. When
considering the refutation of the initial thesis P, one thus has to take into account
two dimensions: a vertical one—the argument T, and a horizontal one—the
systematic parallels, which involve the interplay of T and T0.
2.3 Example of an Argument by Parallels
In order to illustrate the features described above, I now turn to an argument by
parallels initiated by Phya pa that pertains to a topic closely related to the central
theme of Buddhist epistemological works—that of valid cognitions (Skt. prama¯n: a,
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Tib. tshad ma), namely the question of the ascertainment of their validity. This
argument consists in the following set of statements:14
Respondent (=Mı¯ma¯m: saka) Instigator (=Phya pa)
P All valid cognitions (A) are intrinsically
ascertained (X)
P0 All non-conceptual cognitions (A0) are
perceptions (X0)
S1 The appearance of two moons (e
0) would be a
perception (X0), because it is non-conceptual
(A0)
S01 [A cognition] that ascertains that fire appears
but does not ascertain its reality (e) would be
intrinsically ascertained [as valid] (X),
because it is a valid cognition (A)
S2 [A cognition] that ascertains that fire appears
but does not ascertain its reality (e) is not a
valid cognition (A)
S02 The appearance of two moons (e0) is not non-
conceptual (A0)
S3 If the appearance of two moons (e
0) is not
non-conceptual (A0), it is contradictory to
its being vividly appearing (G0)
S03 If the cognition that ascertains fire but not its
truth (e) is not a valid cognition (A), it is
either an unascertained appearance (B) or the
cognition of something already known (C);
the two options have been refuted earlier
S4 We admit that the cognition that ascertains fire
but not its truth (e) is intrinsically
ascertained (X)
S04 We admit that the appearance of two moons
(e0) is a perception (X0)
S5 The appearance of two moons (e
0) is not a
perception (X0), because it is not non-
erroneous with regard to the apprehended
state of affairs (L0 = def[X0])
S05 The cognition that ascertains fire but not its
truth (e) is not intrinsically ascertained (X),
because it does not ascertain by itself the
possession of the definiens of valid
cognition, insofar as doubt with regard to the
object being a superimposition prevents the
establishment that the apprehending
cognition is non-erroneous with regard to the
actual state of affairs (L = def[X])
Although the analysis that follows will focus on the structure of the argument, a
few words of introduction concerning its contents is de rigueur. Buddhist logicians
usually agree that valid cognition is of two sorts, perception and inference. The
question of the ascertainment of their validity, not raised by Dharmakı¯rti, is an issue
that his successors examine, adopting various positions as to what it means to
ascertain the validity of a cognition, as well as to which types of cognition are to be
characterized as being intrinsically or, respectively, extrinsically ascertained as
valid. To make a long story short, Phya pa’s position on the subject is that the
ascertainment of validity amounts to the determination that the cognition under
consideration has the definiens of a valid cognition, and that, at least in some cases,
a distinct cognition is required to ascertain this fact.15 The classical example given
14 The Tibetan text and a translation can be found in the appendix. The same argument is found also in
Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (2006b, 31a5).
15 For Phya pa, the definiens of valid cognition encompasses several characteristics, among which that it
must be novel, it must eliminate opposite superimpositions, and that it must be non-erroneous with regard
to the state of affairs (i.e., cognition is not found in the absence of the state of affairs). Of these
characteristics, novelty and the ability to eliminate superimpositions are held to be always intrinsically
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for an extrinsically ascertained valid cognition is the visual cognition of an object
identifiable as a fire, in which a doubt remains as to whether the ‘‘fire’’ that appears
is a real fire or a magical illusion.16
Phya pa seeks to refute the view of philosophers (identified as Indian followers of
the Mı¯ma¯m: sa¯ tradition) who, for their part, contend that validity is always ascertained
intrinsically. The statement ‘‘all valid cognitions are intrinsically ascertained as valid’’
thus stands as the thesis P under discussion, and its domain is the ascertainment of
validity (D). Since this statement P expresses a universal relation between the property
A ‘‘being a valid cognition’’ and the property X ‘‘being intrinsically ascertained as
valid’’, Phya pa’s retort, in the initial stage, likewise illustrates a universal relation
between two properties. Since any domain can be chosen for the parallel statement,
Phya pa could have retorted for instance that ‘‘all animals are mammals’’, a statement
expressing a universal relation to which no interlocutor would likely subscribe.17
Instead, Phya pa chooses a parallel in the domain of perception (D0), stating as P0: ‘‘all
non-conceptual cognitions are perceptions’’. Like P, P0 expresses a universal relation
between two properties, namely ‘‘being non-conceptual’’ (A0) and ‘‘being a
perception’’ (X0). Here again, it is not necessary to go into the details of the theory
of perception. All we need to know is that Phya pa does not himself hold P0, for he
accepts that there are cases of non-conceptual cognition that fail to qualify as
perceptions. A classical example of such a case is the non-conceptual cognition in
which two moons appear. This ‘‘appearance of two moons’’ falls short of being a
perception because in reality there are not two moons. Hence, such a cognition lacks
one of the conditions that Phya pa includes in the definiens of perception, namely it is
not ‘‘non-erroneous with regard to the apprehended state of affairs’’.18
The intermediate steps of the argument can now be understood as follows:
S1 The respondent points to the absurd consequence that P
0 would have in the
case of the counter-example just discussed, namely the cognition in which two
moons appear (e0). Indeed, if all non-conceptual cognitions were perceptions
Footnote 15 continued
ascertained. On the other hand, the characteristic of being ‘‘non-erroneous with regard to the state of
affairs’’ may necessitate another cognition for its ascertainment in cases when there remains doubt as to
the reality of what is perceived, in other words as to the existence of a corresponding state of affairs. Such
a doubt is only likely to occur when an object is perceived for the first time. For more details see Hugon
(forthcoming).
16 See Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (2006a, 36b9–37a1): rgyang ring po na kha dog dmar la ’bar ba’i kha
dog can gyi me yod pa snang pa na snang par nges kyang ci kho bo 37a1 la mer snang pa ’di bden nam
sgyu ma mkhan gyis sprul pa lasogs pa brdzun pa yin zhes the tsom za bas blo rang nyid bden pa ’jal bar
ma nges pa lta bu’o ||
17 Actually, one does find an alternative formulation of this same argument in a text reporting Phya pa’s
refutation of the Mı¯ma¯m: saka. Phya pa is said to present as an initial retort ‘‘all logical reasons
establishing an entity would be reasons qua effects’’. See Klong chen Rab ’byams pa (2000, 128–129).
18 The position that not all non-conceptual cognitions qualify as perception is shared by Dharmakı¯rti’s
interpreters, since Dharmakı¯rti defined perception as ‘‘devoid of conceptualization and non-erroneous’’
(Prama¯n: avinis´caya I.4a = Nya¯yabindu I.4a: pratyaks:am: kalpana¯pod: ham abhra¯ntam). Note however that
Phya pa’s definition varies slightly from Dharmakı¯rti’s, as he adds the qualification ‘‘non-erronous with
regard to the apprehended state of affairs’’ (gzung don la ma ’khrul ba). For more details about Phya pa’s
views on perception, see Hugon (forthcoming).
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(all A0s are X0), the cognition in which two moons appear would also qualify as
perception. This, however, is contradictory to the instigator’s tenets.
S01 The instigator draws a parallel in the domain of the ascertainment of validity
(D) on the basis of (what he holds to be) a counter-example to P (=all As are X),
that is to say a case of valid cognition that is not intrinsically ascertained. As a
counter-example (e), he states the classical example of the perception of a fire in
which a doubt remains as to the truth of the fire perceived.
S2 The respondent, who for his part does not admit that there is a counter-
example to P, seeks to reject the absurd consequence pertaining to domain D by
rejecting the antecedent ‘‘e is a valid cognition’’ (e is A).
S02 Parallel to this, the instigator rejects the antecedent of the absurd consequence
stated earlier for domain D0, namely that the cognition in which two moons
appear is non-conceptual (e0 is A0).
S3 The respondent shows that rejecting the antecedent (e
0 is A0) contradicts
another tenet of the instigator, namely that the cognition in which two moons
appear is ‘‘vividly appearing’’ (gsal snang). Indeed, being ‘‘vivid’’ is one of the
characteristics of a non-conceptual cognition.
S03 Parallel to this, the instigator shows that rejecting the antecedent (e is A) in
domain D is unacceptable as well. The reason given here relies on an argument
occurring earlier in the text (which is also an argument by parallels), which shows
that the perception e cannot be among the perceptions that are not valid
cognitions; hence it must be accepted as a perception that is a valid cognition.19
S4 The respondent, implicitly admitting that the antecedent (e is A) cannot be
rejected, states in accordance with P his acceptance of the consequent, namely,
that e would then be intrinsically ascertained as valid (e is X).
S04 The instigator claims his acceptance of the parallel consequent in the domain of
perception (D0): the cognition in which two moons appear is a perception (e0 is X0).
S5 The respondent points to the fact that this consequent is refuted by the fact that
e0 does not satisfy the instigator’s own definition of perception.
S05 The instigator states in parallel that the acceptance of the consequent in the
domain of the ascertainment of validity (D) (e is X) is refuted by the fact that e does
not satisfy the definition of a cognition that is intrinsically ascertained as valid.
Here, S5 and S
0
5 constitute the final stage of the argument. Indeed, once one
reaches S5, e
0 has been established as a proper counter-example to P0: it satisfies the
antecedent (e0 is A0), but not the consequent (e0 is X0). Parallel to this, once one
reaches S05, e has been established as a proper counter-example to P: it satisfies the
antecedent (e is A), but not the consequent (e is X). Hence S5 brings an end to the
refutation of P0, and S05 to the refutation of P. Note that the refutation of P0 is not
problematic insofar as the instigator does not actually subscribe to P0.
19 That not every perception is a valid cognition is a characteristic tenet of Phya pa’s epistemology. It
follows from his definitions of perception and valid cognition (see respectively n.18 and n.15) that there
are two sorts of cognition that qualify as perceptions but not as valid cognitions. These are termed
‘‘unascertained appearance’’ (snang la ma nges pa) (they include, among other things, cases of inattentive
cognition), and ‘‘[cognitions whose] object has already been known’’ (bcad pa’i yul can). The first sort
does not fulfil the requirement of ‘‘eliminating opposite superimpositions’’, the second, the requirement of
novelty. Still, both are non-conceptual and non-erroneous with regard to the apprehended state of affairs.
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If one separates the statements that pertain to the domain D and those that pertain
to the domain D0, one can distinguish two intersecting arguments represented in the
table below: in T, the instigator (Phya pa) attacks the thesis P, and in T0, the
respondent (the Mı¯ma¯m: saka) attacks the thesis P
0.
T (D) Mı¯ma¯m: saka/Phya pa T
0 (D0) Phya pa/Mı¯ma¯m: saka
P = all As are X ? P0 = all A0s are X0
S01: e, which is A, would be X / S1: e0, which is A0, would be X0
S2: e is not A ? S02: e0 is not A0
S03: if e is not A, it would be B or C and this has
absurd consequences
/ S3: if e0 is not A0, it would be
contradictory to e0 being G0
S4: then e is X ? S04: then e0 is X0
S05: e is not X, because it does not have
L = def(X)
/ S5: e0 is not X0, because it does not have
L0 = def(X0)
3 The Function of Arguments by Parallels
The majority of sections in which such arguments occur bear the heading ‘‘refutation
[of the opponent’s view]’’ (dgag pa; sun dbyung ba) or ‘‘rejection of objections’’ (rtsod
pa spang ba). The function imparted by the instigator upon an argument by parallels
dealing with a thesis P is hence to be understood as the refutation of P, whether P
represents the respondent’s own position or an objection to the instigator’s position. If
P stands as an objection to a thesis that is to be proved by the instigator, or represents
the opposite of the thesis to be proved, the refutation of P is considered to amount to the
proper establishment of this thesis, and the argument by parallel is in such cases
introduced under the heading ‘‘proof’’ (sgrub pa).20 Note that in either case the
refutation of P stands as an implicit conclusion of the argument by parallels.
One may wonder why the instigator does not have recourse to the methods of proof
and refutation that are prescribed in Buddhist logic, that is to say, inference (i.e.,
‘‘inference-for-others’’)21 on the one hand, and reductio ad absurdum (Skt. prasa _nga,
Tib. thal ’gyur) on the other. Moreover, considering the arguments T and T0 of our
example, an obvious question is why the instigator does not just use T to establish his
point, namely, why does he address P by stating P0 rather than by stating S01? In order
to answer these questions, let us try to characterize more precisely arguments by
parallels and consider the overall strategy that directs their use.
20 For instance in Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (2006a, 89b6–90a2), under the paragraph entitled ‘‘proof [that
there are] arguments by consequence in which only the entailment is expressed’’ (khyab pa tsam brjod pa’i thal
’gyur sgrub pa), the argument addresses a statement P that something else than the entailment must also be
stated: ‘‘in order for an argument by consequence to be certain, it is necessary to express the fact that [the logical
reason is a] property of the subject’’ (gzhan dag thal ’gyur la nges par phyogs chos brjod dgos so zhes zer ba).
21 The ‘‘inference-for-others’’ (para¯rtha¯numa¯na) consists in a set of statements that is meant to allow the
opponent to generate an ‘‘inference-for-oneself’’ (sva¯rtha¯numa¯na), i.e. to establish that the subject under
discussion, which is known to be qualified by the relevant property stated as a logical reason, is also
qualified by the property to be proved, on the grounds of a necessary relation established between the
logical reason and the property to be proved (identity or causality).
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3.1 Parity of Reasoning and Analogy
I would suggest that there are two ways to conceive how an argument by parallels
can lead the respondent to concede the refutation of P in view of the following fact:
when considering T and T0 separately, the refutation of P stands as the implicit
conclusion of T, whereas when considering the sequence of statements in the
argument by parallels, the refutation of P emerges as a conclusion that is parallel to
the implicit refutation of P0. In the first case, since T and T0 display the same
argumentative pattern, the respondent who accepts the probative, or rather,
refutative power of T0 must also accept that of T, by parity of reasoning. In this
case, it is the ‘‘vertical’’ dimension of the argument that prevails, although it is
supported by the ‘‘horizontal’’ dimension insofar as each of the key steps of T are
introduced as parallels to the corresponding steps of T0. Let us note however that
they do not logically depend on the latter. The reasons given for their establishment
also do not logically depend on those given in T0 (whether or not these reasons take
a parallel form)22. One way to apprehend the strategy behind arguments by parallels
is thus as follows: 1. The instigator challenges the respondent with a (wisely chosen)
thesis P0 in some domain D0. 2. The respondent catches the bait and generates an
argument T0 leading to the refutation of P0. 3. The instigator applies an argument T
in domain D that reproduces, mutatis mutandis, all the steps of the argument T0.
4. The respondent must subscribe to the refutation of P by parity of reasoning.
Otherwise, he is compelled to acknowledge a flaw in the reasoning he uses to refute
P0, or is bound to admit P0. Let us note to this effect that such a strategy can work
even if the respondent generates an argument T0 that is not valid (and there are
actually a few instances of such cases in Phya pa’s texts).
In the second perspective, the ‘‘horizontal’’ dimension of the argument by
parallels takes precedence. The idea is then the following: if everything that is said
about a set of elements of D0 holds also, mutatis mutandis, for corresponding
elements in D (and vice versa), any conclusion that is conditioned by this set of
elements in one domain also holds, mutatis mutandis, for the other domain. One can
thus describe the process leading the respondent to the conclusion as a variety of
analogical reasoning. ‘‘Analogy’’ is here to be understood not as similarity, but
rather as considered in the light of the structure-mapping framework developed in
recent studies, that discards the wide-spread opinion that analogy should involve
elements of the same category (see Brown 1995) and instead gives prominence to
the mapping of the relations between elements and to relations between relations
over the mapping of properties of these elements (see Gentner 1983). In such a
framework, the projection of conclusions (such as the application of a predicate)
from a base domain (or source analogue) to a target domain that takes place in
analogical reasoning is enabled by the structural alignment between the elements
constitutive of each domain. Although there is a tendency to consider analogical
22 The reason given to establish the probative statements of T occasionally relies on a parallel, as for
instance in S05: the definiens of X is introduced as a counterpart to the definiens of X0, and the reason, in
both cases, relies on the same implicit rule that ‘‘what does not have the definiens cannot have the
definiendum’’. In S3 on the other hand, the reason given for the relation between e and A is not parallel to
the one given for the relation between e0 and A0 in S03.
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arguments as a type of ampliative and probabilistic reasoning, useful as a heuristic
device, but unable to achieve certainty, some modern scholars defend the possibility
of a ‘‘valid reasoning by analogy’’ (Weitzenfeld 1984) or of a ‘‘conclusive analogy’’
(Juthe 2005), or attempt to establish the sufficient criterion to establish the truth of an
analogical inference (Davies and Russell 1987). Andre´ Juthe’s study, in particular,
contains elements that are relevant for our analysis of arguments by parallels.
According to Juthe, there are two distinctions that can be made when characterizing
arguments by analogy. The first distinction, between ‘‘good’’ arguments and ‘‘bad’’
arguments by analogy, relies on the isomorphism of the structures containing the
elements that determine the application of the predicate that one wants to project,
mutatis mutandis, to the target domain. The closer the structures are to being
isomorphic, the better the analogy.23 Isomorphism amounts, in the system-mapping
framework, to a structural alignment that satisfies complete one-to-one correspon-
dence of the relevant elements, parallel connectivity (i.e. preservation of the relations
between them) and systematicity (i.e. preservation of the relations between
relations). The second distinction, between ‘‘conclusive’’ and ‘‘inconclusive’’ good
arguments by analogy, is a function of the determination, in the base domain, of the
conclusion that one wishes to project—an analogical argument is ‘‘conclusive’’ when
the elements that determine the application of a predicate in the base domain
determine it strictly (rather than through mere correlation).24
Strict determination
Applied predicate
Applied predicate
(mutatis mutandis)
Isomorphism
Base domain Target domain
Returning to arguments by parallels, one can conceive that while the notion of
isomorphism between the base and the target domain finds an equivalent in the
‘‘horizontal’’ dimension of the argument, Juthe’s condition for a conclusive argument,
23 ‘‘The rule is that the extent of counterpart elements in common to the compared objects, will
determine the range of the conclusion with the same proportion’’ (Juthe 2005, p. 9). ‘‘In a complete
analogy there is a one-to-one correspondence between all the elements of the objects of comparison and
any justified conclusion from the Analogue will be (mutatis mutandis or not) justified about the Target-
Subject as well’’ (ibid., p. 10).
24 ‘‘The conclusion can be said to follow conclusively from the analogy even if it is not in virtue of
logical necessity’’ (Juthe 2005, p. 11). See also Weitzenfeld (1984, p. 141): ‘‘[C]onclusions will follow
apodeictically from a genuine isomorphism’’. And further (ibid. 141): ‘‘Any set of relations defined on a
set of elements can constitute a structure, and any isomorphism between structures can support valid
inferences, but the modality, or ontological status, of the relations comprising a structure is very
important both for the means of establishing the existence of the structure and for the range of inferences
it will license.’’ See also Davies and Russell (1987, p. 4) for a definition of the ‘‘determination rule.’’
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i.e. the strict determination of the applied predicate in the base domain, would find for
its part an equivalent in the ‘‘vertical’’ dimension, for, by generating the argument T0,
the respondent determines in which way the structure of the relevant elements of
domain D0 supports the conclusion, i.e., the refutation of P0. Now, what happens in an
argument by parallels is that the isomorphism of the two domains is established by
enumeration. Therefore, the conclusion for D does not have to be derived from the
conclusion reached for D0, it can simply be derived from T.25
The two persepctives that I initially distinguished hence turn out to be akin,
although with different foci: The ‘‘parity of reasoning perspective’’ emphasizes the
pattern of argumentation that leads to the conclusion, and thereby the role of the
respondent who generates this pattern for the parallel domain D0. The ‘‘analogical
perspective’’ puts the emphasis on the parallelism between the structures of the
corresponding elements in D and D0—for instance in our example the relations
between the elements (e,A,X) and between the elements (e0,A0,X0)—and on the role
of the instigator, whose seemingly automated replies now appear as a means to
establish the putative isomorphism between the two domains. The instigator has to
choose the counterpart-elements and to establish the conservation of their structure.
This, in turns, is necessary to guarantee the applicability in D of the pattern of
reasoning used in T0. Indeed, although the respondent should not object to the
pattern of T as such, he can, and does in some cases (such as in the argument under
consideration here), object to the conditions for its application. For instance in our
example, the respondent, although he agrees that the existence of a counter-example
refutes the contention of a universal relation, objects that e is a counter-example to
P like e0 is a counter-example to P0.
3.2 The Status of the Conclusion
What is the status of the implicit conclusion of an argument by parallels? Juthe
contends that in a good, conclusive argument by analogy, the conclusion has the same
certainty as that of a deductive argument, albeit this certainty does not have the same
source.26 This certainty is grounded in the strict determination of the application of the
predicate in the source domain. In this perspective, in argument by parallels, the status
25 In analogical arguments, the establishment of the isomorphism threatens the relevance of using an
analogy in the first place. Weitzenfeld (1984, p. 146) proposes that an isomorphism can be known by
enumeration, surveillance, or inference, and he says about the first one: ‘‘By and large this is not a
promising way to learn anything, since any knowledge that is to be inferred from the isomorphism must
be discovered in the process of enumeration before the isomorphism is known.’’ Davies and Russell, who
have a specifically computer-related goal, namely ‘‘to provide a reliable, programmable strategy that will
enable a system to draw conclusions by analogy only when it should’’ (Davies and Russell 1987, p. 1),
deal with the above question under the name of ‘‘non-redundancy problem’’, and they express it as
follows: ‘‘The background knowledge that justifies an analogy or single-instance generalization should be
insufficient to imply the conclusion given information only about the target. The source instance should
provide information not otherwise contained in the database’’ (ibid., 2).
26 Juthe (2005, p. 19): ‘‘[T]he conclusion follows conclusively but not deductively. It would not be a
logical incoherence to deny the conclusion at the same time as one affirms the premises of an argument by
conclusive analogy.’’
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of the conclusion would be a function of the argument developed by the respondent for
the parallel domain D0. From the point of view of the appeal to parity of reasoning, it is
a function of T0 as well. Still, the certainty of the conclusion relies on the existence of
the putative isomorphism of the two domains, which, alone, can guarantee that the
premisses of T are true. When these conditions are met, the conclusion is certain, but
insofar as it could be established by T independently, the introduction of the parallel is
useless from a logical point of view.
The technique of systematic parallels turns out to be convenient if T itself involves a
flaw, or a difficulty. This is actually the case in our example: First, let us consider the
reason given in S03 for e being an A, namely for showing that the counter-example
satisfies the antecedent. This reason relies on Phya pa’s typology of perceptual
cognition, which is quite idiosyncratic even among Buddhist logicians. Next, the
argument given in S05 for e not being an X relies on the fact that e does not have L,
which is the definiens of X. This reason comes as a parallel to the one given by the
respondent in S5 for e
0 not being an X0, namely, that e0 does not have L0, which is the
definiens of X0. If we look closer, we notice that L is the definiens of X only according
to Phya pa. Thus what T actually establishes is that P must be rejected by someone who
admits Phya pa’s typology of perceptual cognitions and his definition of intrinsic
ascertainment. But for a respondent who does not subscribe to Phya pa’s system in the
first place, T is not a sound argument because its premises are not held to be
established. It is thus conceivable that the parallel argumentation, which introduces the
problematic (putatively probative) statements of T as parallels rather than as
independent statements, is used here as a way to conceal this weakness.
I have noted earlier that arguments by parallels can also be successful if the
respondent generates an argument T0 that is not valid. In both cases, although it is
possible that the respondent concedes the refutation of P, this conclusion does not
have the certainty that is required of a logical argumentation. Nevertheless, Phya pa
does not seem to consider that the conclusion that is reached in such cases has less
certainty than the ones derived from the otherwise prescribed methods of proof and
refutation. He thus seems to be granting argumentation by parallels the status of a
logical argumentation, and not merely that of a discursive technique. Contrastively,
one can note that a later author, Sa skya Pan:d: ita (1182–1251), distinguishes
explicitely in his argumentation what consistutes a ‘‘real answer’’ (dngos po’i lan) to
an objection from other techniques, such as the equivalent of tu quoque
argumentation (presented in terms of mgo mtshungs kyis dgag pa), which are
thereby ascribed a lesser status.27
3.3 The Benefits of Argumentation by Parallels
In view of the rhetorical strategy in play, arguments by parallels can be shown to
have several advantages. The first one, as came out of the above discussion, is that it
adds a convincing weight to an otherwise sound argument, or makes up for a flaw in
an argument. One can in addition distinguish the following profits:
27 See Sa skya Pan:d: ita Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan: (1989, 106–109).
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3.3.1 A Double Task for the Respondent
One of the roles of the respondent in the argument by parallels amounts to the
generation of an argument T0 from which the instigator derives the argument T. As
one can see when comparing T to T0, it is the respondent who provides the points
that bring about the conclusion of T0, namely the refutation of P0. Their parallels in
domain D, for their part, support the conclusion of T, and therewith the refutation of
the respondent’s initial thesis. In brief, it is the respondent who provides the
instigator with the means to refute him!
As T and T0 are intermingled in the argument by parallels, the respondent does
not only deal with T0, but also objects to the successive steps of T reached by the
instigator, hence defending his claim P against the instigator. The objections that the
respondent raises in the course of the argument by parallels are not different from
those that he would raise when T is stated as an independent argument. However,
due to the structure of the argument, the respondent is bound to experience what I
call a ‘‘boomerang effect’’. Namely, just as every argument he gives against P0
comes back as an argument against P, each of his arguments in defence of P comes
back as a defence of P0 that he has to address. But by doing so, he provides the
instigator with an answer to every objection against T. Hence the respondent is not
only providing the instigator with an argument against P, he also (indirectly of
course) secures it against any objection.
The instigator’s actions are limited to 1. motivating a reaction from the
respondent in the first place, and 2. drawing parallels from the respondent’s
statements. By doing so, the instigator succeeds not only in keeping the respondent
under the burden of proof, but even better, gets the respondent to come up with an
argument that will work against his own position and can resist all objections. That
P0 ends up being refuted in the process is not a problem for the instigator, for it did
not represent his own accepted position in the first place, but was only designed to
reveal the falsity of P.
Hence it is obviously advantageous for an instigator to initiate this type of
argumentation. It can moreover be seen as a good technique for a debater who does
not know how to refute a thesis P in a live debate. More charitably, the instigator
can also be thought to be using this technique as a pedagogical device. The question,
which I will address in Sect. 4.1, remains why any sensible respondent would
willingly engage in such a type of self-defeating debate.
3.3.2 The Parallel Domain as an Example
One can also consider that the parallel domain is introduced to play the role of an
example with regard to the application of a rule of reasoning. Examples are
notoriously famous in Buddhist logic for their use in inference, in particular the type
of inference termed ‘‘inference-for-others’’, in which the proponent verbally
presents the opponent with the evidence that will allow him to establish a certain
property for the subject under discussion. There, examples serve as a device that
allows the addressee of the inferential reasoning to remember the entailment
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between the logical reason given as evidence and the property to be proved.28
Whereas the example in an inference-for-others is an object instantiating a relation
(for instance the example ‘kitchen’ when inferring fire from the presence of smoke),
the parallel domain in an argument by parallels is a set of elements instantiating a
structure (i.e. relations between elements and higher-order relations). It can thus
provide the basis for the application of logical operations that are more complex
than entailment between two properties.29 It must be noted that in the majority of
cases the rule or reasoning itself, in an abstract form, as well as the identification of
the relation between the elements (for instance definiens-definiendum, cause-effect,
etc.) are not made explicit in the course of the argument by parallels, which goes
from a particular application to another particular application.30
A point in support of the parallel domain playing the role of an example is the
fact that some cases of arguments by parallels occurring in Phya pa’s Dispeller are
transformed in the Sunray of Wisdom into an argument of an explanatory type that
does not involve an initial retort, nor the structure that follows from it. There, the
other domain is introduced as an example in a way similar to the statement of the
example in an inference-for-others.31
28 On ‘‘inference-for-others’’, see n. 21 as well as T. Tillemans’ introduction to this volume. For more
information on the use of examples, see Katsura and Steinkellner (2004).
29 With regard to this idea, it is interesting to note that in recent years analogy has been used for
developing computational systems that are able to prove target theorems, i.e. to develop a ‘‘target proof’’
on the basis of a given source theorem established by a source proof (Melis 1996). Analogy is also used in
the process of ‘‘retrieving’’ the solution to a problem from a prior analogous example (Gentner 1998).
Similarly, in the argument by parallels, one could say that the instigator is inviting the respondent to
retrieve the argument generated for D0 in order to apply it to D, but with the important nuance that the
respondent first has to generate the argument for D0.
30 The general rule is made explicit on very few occasions in the Dispeller. In one instance for example,
one finds the rule ‘‘by refuting the definiens one refutes the application of the definiendum’’. This rule is
explicitly given after the presentation of the parallel statement. Namely, the statement ‘‘when one refutes
that it (i.e. the inference of the property ‘impermanent’ from the property ‘being an object of cognition’)
is an inference generally speaking because there is no comprehension issued from a triply characterized
reason, one also refutes that it is a valid inference’’ (de la tshul gsum pa’i rtags las rtogs pa med pas rjes
dpag tsam khegs pa na rjes dpag tshad ma’ang khegs so zhe na), is replied to by the instigator as follows:
‘‘In the case of the apprehension of a conch as yellow, etc., as well, when one refutes that it is a perception
generally speaking because there is no being non-erroneous with regard to the apprehended state of
affairs, one also refutes that it is a valid perception, because when one refutes the definiens, one also
refutes the definiendum’’ (dung ser por ’dzin pa lasogs pa la’ang gzung pa’i don la ma ’khrul ba med pas
mngon sum tsam khegs pa na mngon sum tshad ma’ang khegs pa yin te mtshan nyid khegs na mtshon
bya’ang khegs pa’i phyir ro). See Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (2006a, 34a6–34a7).
31 See for instance the argument about the validity of inference mentioned above (see n.11). In contrast, in
the Sunray of Wisdom, Phya pa answers to the same objection as follows: ‘‘being a valid cognition (=the
understanding of something true) is not an independent property but depends on the object; therefore
although it (i.e., inference) is a wrong cognition with regard to the apprehended object, it is not contradictory
with its being a valid cognition with regard to the object of application. Just like it is not contradictory that fire
is a cause with regard to smoke, although it (i.e. the fire) is subsequent with regard to the fire-wood’’ (Phya pa
Chos kyi seng ge (2006b, 78a6–78a7): gzhan dag gis rjes su dpag pa ni gzung yul don spyi la ltos nas log pa’i
shes pa yin pa’i phyir tshad mar myi ’thad do zhes rgol ba na tshad ma ni dag pa ba ma yin te | yul la ltos pa’i
chos yin pas gzung yul la ltos nas log shes yin yang ’jug la ltos nas tshad ma yin pa myi ’gal te | 78a7 mye de bud
shing las ltos nas phyis ’byung yin yang du ba la ltos na rgyur myi ’gal ba bzhin no zhes gzhan gyi gnod pa
spong ba ni…).
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3.3.3 Explanatory Device
For the author of a text, an argument by parallels can be used as an explanatory, or even
pedagogical device, for it allows him to make a detailed presentation of his position
while contrasting it with a false understanding. This possibility is opened to the author
either as an instigator, especially against an objection to his own views, or as a
respondent addressing a putative parallel. In addition, the author’s presentation
beneficiates, on a didactical level, from the support of a parallel, more familiar domain,
in which the various relations between elements can be more easily grasped by a reader
or an opponent. This feature of arguments by parallels might not be obvious in the
example we analyzed, where both domains involve quite ‘‘technical’’ notions. Its
pedagogical benefit might be clearer when considering the example, cited in Sect.
2.1.1, of the retort introducing sprouts and seeds in answer to the objection concerning
inference. The parallel domain makes use of the familiar notions of ‘‘before’’ and
‘‘after’’, and ‘‘seed’’ and ‘‘sprout’’ to illustrate how notions such as ‘‘cause’’ and
‘‘effect’’ are always to be considered in function of an object: the sprout is not the cause
of the seed, but this does not prevent it from being the cause of a visual perception. The
author’s views on inference can be explicitated on the basis of this comprehension: the
notions of ‘‘correct’’ and ‘‘incorrect’’ also must be understood in function of an object;
inference might not be correct with regard to the apprehended object, but this does not
prevent it from being correct with regard to the object of application. Here, thanks to
the parallel domain, the author can point to a part of the structure of the domain of
inference that was not explicit in the original objection-thesis P, namely that two
objects have to be taken into consideration, and that only one of them is relevant to
decide on the validity of inference.
4 Arguments by Parallels in the Framework of Indo-Tibetan Logic
4.1 The Plausibility of a Two-Voiced Parallel Argument
In view of the form of arguments by parallels, which is that of a dialogue, one may
wonder if their use originated in oral debate. We do not have any evidence that such
arguments actually took place in oral debate at the time of Phya pa, and there
remains the question, raised before in Sect. 3.3, of the plausibility that a respondent
would actually ‘‘go along’’ with the process and actually answer an initial retort and
the subsequent systematic parallels in the above-described way, instead of refusing
from the start to enter into a discussion pertaining to an unrelated domain D0.
One point is clearly in favour of such a possibility: Although it would appear that
the respondent merely fulfils a heavy and non-gratifying task in an argument by
parallels, its structure grants him one power that the instigator does not have: the
respondent can choose the course of the argument whereas the instigator can only
proceed with parallel statements. Hence, by choosing pertinent replies the
respondent has the possibility to make the argument unsuccessful for the instigator.
We see that this is precisely what Phya pa does when he is faced with a retort.
Additionally, he even takes the opportunity to expound on his views in the process.
110 P. Hugon
123
One technique used by Phya pa to this effect when he is the respondent is to give a
response in the form of a question such as ‘‘Why do you state P0?’’ or ‘‘What is the
reason for P0?’’. The instigator, who has to play by the rules, has no choice but to
retort in parallel: ‘‘Why do you state P?’’ or ‘‘What is the reason for P?’’. This gives
the respondent (i.e., Phya pa) the opportunity, in the next step, to explain why he
holds P. The structure of the elements of the domain D is then presented according
to his own views rather than those of the instigator, and it becomes possible, at some
point, to reach the conclusion ‘‘it is not the same.’’
4.2 Oral Arguments and Written Arguments
Even if we can envisage the arguments by parallels found in Phya pa’s works as
mirroring an oral practice, written arguments found in a treatise cannot be considered
simple transcripts of oral debates, despite their dialectical form. In both cases, the
instigator’s argument has two addressees: the opponent (i.e., the respondent) and the
public (or the reader or listener of the treatise). But there is an important difference: in
a live debate, the principal addressee is the opponent, a real debater who plays an
active role. In a written argument on the other hand, the author, when initiating a
dispute, also takes the voice of the respondent. The choice of the response, what is
said or left unsaid, the objections raised, addressed or ignored—all this falls within
the competence of the author, and is indicative of another difference: in the case of a
treatise, it is the reader (or listener) who has become the principal addressee. Thus the
author’s assumptions about the reader’s knowledge, about his possible agreement
with the opponent’s tenets, etc., play a major role in his choice of formulation of an
argument. For instance, in the argument we analyzed above, it is quite obvious that
the respondent’s statements are from the hand of the author, considering (notwith-
standing the fact that there were no Mı¯ma¯m: saka in Tibet and that the Mı¯ma¯m: saka did
not know Phya pa’s view on perception) that the respondent could have brought the
argument to another outcome with different answers. Moreover, with or without the
introduction of the parallel domain, Phya pa’s argument would most probably never
have convinced a Mı¯ma¯m: saka insofar as, as I have shown above, its putative
probative steps are themselves problematic. But I would suggest that this was not its
role: although Phya pa does have to address the Mı¯ma¯m: saka tenet if he wants to be
able to claim in his treatise that ‘‘all the other positions have been refuted’’, his goal is
not to convince the Mı¯ma¯m: saka that his position is wrong, but to convince the reader
that the Mı¯ma¯m: saka’s position is wrong. And the intended reader is here clearly an
adherent of Phya pa’s system.
4.3 Theory and Practice
Although Phya pa makes abundant use of arguments by parallels, a theoretical
presentation of them is not included in his chapter entitled ‘‘the way to talk in the
context of disputation’’ (rtsod pa’i ngag gi tshul), nor anywhere else in his
epistemological works. A systematic presentation is also not found in the works of
his Indian and Tibetan predecessors or in those of his disciples, where even the use
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of such arguments becomes scarcer.32 The closest we come to a theoretical
comment about arguments by parallels is Phya pa’s remark, following his citation of
such an argument used by one of his predecessors, qualifying the parallel as a ‘‘true
similarity’’ (mtshungs pa bden) (Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge 2006a, 43b7). The
isolated use of the expressions cha mthun gyi mgo bsgre (‘‘an analogue parallel’’, or
‘‘a conducive retort’’) and thod rgal pa’i mgo bsgre (literally ‘‘angry parallel’’) by
Sa skya Pan:d: ita also hints at the existence of a technical vocabulary related to the
evaluation of arguments by parallels.33
Whether we consider the practice of debate or written treatises, the use of
arguments by parallels appears to conflict with the means of proof and refutation
described and prescribed in the works of Dharmakı¯rti and adopted by his Indian and
Tibetan epigones. In particular, they contravene to the duties ascribed to the
proponent (snga rgol) and opponent (phyi rgol) when entering a philosophical
debate. These are, in summary, to present correct arguments, and to duly point out
the faults in the other debater’s argumentation. The structure of arguments by
parallels would at most resemble that of the so-called ‘‘six-winged disputation’’
(s:at:paks: ı¯ katha¯) discussed in Gotama’s Nya¯yasu¯tra 39–43, in which one (or both) of
the opponents, instead of rejecting the criticism aimed at his position, invokes as an
argument that the same fault occurs for the opponent. This, according to the author
of the Nya¯yasu¯tra, is a paradigmatic case of a futile debate, for the debater (or both
debaters) commits the fallacy of ‘‘confessing the intended [fault]’’ (mata¯nujn˜a¯).34
The occurrence of arguments by parallels even in treatises that prescribe the rules
of debate to be followed (not mentioning arguments by parallels in the process),
would support the conjecture that these rules were above all ‘‘ideal rules of debate’’
which, in practice, did not exclude the use of a broader range of argumentative
techniques involving not only dialectical but also rhetorical, pedagogical and
explanatory functions.
32 As for Phya pa’s predecessors, the only epistemological works available are those of rNgog Blo ldan
shes rab (1059–1109?), where I have not as yet found occurrences of arguments by parallels. Phya pa
reports the use of such arguments by unidentified predecessors, but we lack first-hand evidence. They are
merely designated as ‘‘some’’, ‘‘others’’, ‘‘some of our bla ma’’, ‘‘some ancient learned ones’’, and even as
‘‘some who think they are excellent although they are of small intellect’’. In the absence of more precise
identification and of the works concerned, the question remains as to whether we are dealing with a literal
account, or if Phya pa is ‘‘reformatting’’ their arguments. As for Phya pa’s successors, I have not
extensively searched for such arguments in post fourteenth century works, but one can note for instance
that mKhas grub rje (1385–1438) occasionally resorts to arguments called ‘‘rigs sgre’’, whose first step
corresponds to a ‘‘mtshungs pa’’, but which do not display the complete features of arguments by
parallels.
33 See Sa skya Pan:d: ita Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan, (1989, 183–184).
34 See Gotama (1990). Such an argument can follow from the use of ‘‘analogues’’ (sama) that constitute
futile rejoinders (ja¯ti). For instance, to someone who proves that ‘‘sound is non-eternal because it is a
product, like a pot’’, one can oppose a futile rejoinder in the form of the following analogue: ‘‘sound is
eternal, because it is incorporeal, like ether’’. The futile rejoinder rests on the similarity in the two cases of
the homogeneity between the subject (sound) and the example (respectively, pot and ether). It is ‘‘futile’’,
because unlike a pot, which exemplifies an invariable connection between product-ness and non-
eternality, ether does not exemplify an invariable connection between incorporeality and eternality. Once
the original proposition and the rejoinder have been stated, the proponent can point out the fault in the
rejoinder. At this point, if the opponent urges that the same fault occurs in the original proposition, he
admits by doing so that the fault does occur in his own position.
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Appendix: Tibetan Text and Translation
Dispeller (Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge 2006a, 35b8–36a2)
P spyod pa ba lasogs pa tshad ma thams cad rang las 35b9 nges ’dod pa dag la
P0 de
ltar na rtog med thams cad mngon sum yin no zhes bsgre’o |
S1 ’o na zla ba gnyis snang yang rtog med yin pas mngon sum du thal lo zhe na
|S
0
1 me snang par nges kyang bden par ma nges pa’ang tshad ma yin pas rang nges su
thal lo |
S2 de tshad ma nyid ma yin no zhe na |S
0
2 zla ba gnyis snang rtog med ma yin no |
S3 ’o na gsal snang du ’gal lo zhe na |S
0
3 tshad ma ma yin na 36a1 snang la ma nges
pa ’am bcad pa’i yul can gang rung du ’gyur na sngar bshad pa’i nyes pas gnod do |
S4 rang nges su thal ba ’dod do zhe na |S
0
4 mngon sum du thal ba’ang ’dod do |
S5 gzung don la ma ’khrul ba bkag pas mngon sum khegs so zhe na |S
0
5 yul sgro btags
su dogs pa na ’dzin pa don la mi ’khrul pa’i rnam par ma nges te tshad ma’i mtshan nyid
dang ldan par rdzas de nyid kyis ma nges pas rang nges khegs 36a2 pa yin no ||
P To the Mı¯ma¯m: saka and others who accept that all valid cognitions are
intrinsically ascertained [as valid] P
0
we retort: ‘‘in that case, all non-conceptual
cognitions are perceptions’’.
S1 If it is said that it would absurdly follow that the appearance of two moons also
would be a perception on the grounds that it is non-conceptual,S
0
1 [we reply] that it
would absurdly follow that [a cognition] that ascertains that fire appears but does not
ascertain its [objective] truth also would be intrinsically ascertained on the grounds
that it is a valid cognition.
S2 If it is said that this [cognition] is not a valid cognition, S
0
2 [we reply] that the
appearance of two moons is not non-conceptual.
S3 If it is said that it is contradictory to the fact that it (i.e. two moons) appears
clearly, S
0
3 [we reply] that if it (i.e. the cognition that ascertains fire, but not its truth)
is not a valid cognition, and would be instead either an unascertained appearance or
the cognition of something already known, it is refuted in view of the faults
previously explained.
S4 If it is said that one accepts the consequence that it (i.e. the cognition that
ascertains fire, but not its truth) is intrinsically accepted, S
0
4 [we reply] that we, for our
part, also admit the consequence that [the appearance of two moons] is a perception.
S5 If it is said that its (i.e. the appearance of two moons) being a perception is
rejected, because one rejects that it is non-erroneous with regard to the apprehended
state of affairs, S
0
5 [we reply] that its (i.e. the cognition that ascertains fire, but not its
truth) being intrinsically ascertained as valid is rejected for the following reason:
when there is doubt as to whether the object is superimposed, the apprehending
cognition is not ascertained as being non-erroneous with regard to a state of affairs,
and is consequently not being ascertained through that substance (i.e. cognition)
itself as possessing the definiens of valid cognition.
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